For universities the Accord interim report proposes a more extreme version of Job-Ready Graduates

The Australian Universities Accord interim report recommends overturning the most controversial Job-ready Graduates policy, using student contribution price signals to guide student course choices.

But overall the Accord interim report and Job-ready Graduates have strong parallels. They both take a utilitarian view of higher education, that its purpose is to provide benefits to others rather than being of any intrinsic value. Universities exist to meet skills needs, find practical uses for research, contribute to their local communities, and promote equity. The main difference is the interim report proposals are, with student contributions the main exception, more extreme and interventionist than Job-ready Graduates.

Substantially reduced university autonomy

Historically universities in Australia and other western countries have operated with a significant degree of autonomy from government. But despite using the word ‘autonomy’ a few times the Accord interim report shows little interest in this idea.

On my count at least 25 interim report proposals would reduce the scope of university-level decision making or are new reporting requirements that set universities up for future regulation. In my list these cover general mission direction, student admissions, the mix of disciplines and courses, curriculum and teaching, use of funds, and accountability.

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The decline of the humanities

A couple of days ago the Sydney Morning Herald published an article on falling enrolments in university humanities subjects, with a focus on history and English.

I’ve converted the data into an index to make it easier to see the trends in fields with different absolute numbers of full-time equivalent enrolments. In the late 2000s and early 2010s the humanities shared in general enrolment growth, but after that went into decline. History’s growth and decline were greater than the humanities in general.

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Free higher education as income and consumption smoothing

The argument that free higher education would create additional higher education opportunities is empirically weak. History and international comparisons show that participation rates increase without it, and indeed due to budget constraints free higher education can lead to lower participation rates.

However there is another argument for free higher education which, while still contentious, has goals and likely outcomes that are consistent with each other.

Free higher education and income/consumption smoothing

The strongest argument for free (or cheaper) higher education is a better balancing of income and consumption over the life cycle. Needs are more consistent through life than income. Most people consume more than they earn when young and old and a large proportion earn more than they consume during their full-time working years. Smoothing these out is one of the principal functions of welfare states.

Compared to upfront fees or mortgage style student loans paid in instalments the HELP repayment system already has strong smoothing effects. It pushes the expense of higher education away from the years when full-time study limits scope for paid work. On low incomes no HELP repayment is required or repayments that are less than the minimum likely mortgage style loan repayment amount. On high incomes HELP repayments are more than the likely mortgage style loan repayment amount.

And higher education is already free for HELP debtors who persistently earn less than the first repayment threshold.

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Would free university increase or decrease higher education participation rates in Australia?

In a previous post I argued that Australia’s practice of charging fees for higher education reflects its broader patterns of taxation and public funding of social services.

But we have had free higher education before, 1974-1988. For a government already spending over $600 billion a year the cost of free higher education is not beyond the feasible range. I estimate costs at $4.6 to $5.9 billion a year on status quo numbers of student places in public universities. The range reflects uncertainties about how domestic students currently paying full fees would be handled. The $4.6 billion transitions currently Commonwealth supported students to free, while the $5.9 billion fully compensates universities for lost fee revenue.

Of the arguments for free higher education the one that people find most intuitive is that it would increase higher education participation. People consume more when prices go down. But somebody is paying – the government on behalf of taxpayers – and so how they would respond is the key variable in whether the number of students would go up or down.

Debt aversion

Supporters of free higher education often make demand-side arguments, that fees or loans are a deterrent to higher education participation, especially to people from disadvantaged backgrounds.

As someone with working class origins free higher education advocate Duncan Maskell says he would not have gone to university if he had to take out a loan. Occasional school student surveys have picked up similar sentiments. But the ‘debt aversion’ hypothesis has always had trouble distinguishing between sensible prudence around taking out debt that probably is not worth it (good debt aversion), and over-caution in taking out debts that would probably lead to significant long-term benefits (bad debt aversion).

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Why do Australian university students pay fees?

University of Melbourne VC Duncan Maskell secured some not always entirely positive media coverage today for his call to make university education free for domestic students.

University education is free or very cheap for students in some European countries and was also free in Australia between 1974 and 1988.

Why do countries differ on university fees?

My theory of why countries differ on this issue draws loosely on the work of Julian Garritzmann. We observe broad coherence between higher education finance systems in each country and their overall tax and social service/benefits systems. The chart below shows patterns in the OECD. Australia is in a cluster of countries in our region with government expenditure below 40 per cent of GDP and quite similar fees in $USD purchasing power parity terms. The countries with free higher education tend to have governments that consume more than 50 per cent of GDP.

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Are mini-demand driven systems a good idea?

In their second submissions to the Universities Accord review Universities Australia and Innovative Research Universities both call for extending the existing demand driven system for regional and remote Indigenous students to all Indigenous students.

Mini-demand driven systems support increasing enrolments from a target population, or potentially in a target course, without risking (from a government perspective) a major cost escalation under a full demand driven system.

Although I support a return to full demand driven funding I doubt that mini-demand driven systems are a good idea.

The risks of restricted-use funds

From a government perspective the attraction of mini-demand driven systems is their apparent pursuit of some desirable outcome at low cost. Only funding for the estimated additional student places is likely to be ‘new’ money.

If so, in the transition to a new mini-demand driven system each university would lose from its overall maximum block grant amount estimated funding for current students meeting the mini-demand driven criteria – in the UA/IRU case, probably the Commonwealth contribution value of their existing student load of Indigenous students living in metropolitan areas.

As a result, ‘old’ money that could once be used flexibly for any domestic student could after the clawback only be used for about four per cent of the population.

If in practice the university attracts fewer Indigenous students than expected, or these students enrol in subjects valued at less in Commonwealth contribution terms than forecast, then the university is left with stranded resources. It has student funding that is theoretically available but in practice cannot be used.

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The 20,000 equity places that nearly weren’t allocated and that will probably never be delivered

At the 2022 election Labor promised up to 20,000 new student places in skills shortage areas for members of equity groups. The minister announced high-level allocations last October. The funding agreements implementing the promise for 2023 were published last month, providing additional but not complete detail. This a multi-year program and the current 2021-2023 funding agreements do not include 2024 commencing places.

This post describes the available information on student place allocation, highlighting the policy and legal flaws in distributing funding this way. The policy’s problems are exacerbated by the Job-ready Graduates Commonwealth contribution changes.

Allocations by funding cluster

When universities received their allocations many were surprised by student places they had not requested. These were in funding cluster 1, the law, commerce and most humanities cluster. Just over 30 per cent (3,026) of the 9,851 places allocated in this round are in cluster 1.

The Department of Education’s manoeuvre can be seen in the funding agreements, an example below, which are prescriptive about the use of cluster 2 and 3 places, following information in funding applications, but not cluster 1. Instead, another clause says ‘these [cluster 1] places are to be delivered in line with a separate agreement between the Provider and the Department.’ To stay consistent with the original guidelines the cluster 1 courses need to be in skills shortage fields. Accounting and auditing are on the skills shortage list, although universities could also find other ‘relevant industry needs or shortages’.

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Urban prospective students and regional student places: the Job-ready Graduates growth mismatch

In an earlier post I looked at how Job-ready Graduates could produce fewer total student places than originally forecast. This post examines the geographic distribution of those places. Both posts draw on my first submission to the Universities Accord review.

Job-ready Graduates ‘growth’ funding is based on campus location (‘growth’ in quotation marks because it is off a reduced base). Regional campuses get 3.5 per cent annual funding growth, with 2.5 per cent for metropolitan campuses in high growth areas, and 1 per cent for other campuses. Higher growth rates for regional campuses reflect concern about lower university participation rates for people from regional areas.

Growth funding is for coming increases in the school leaver population, which will translate into increased demand for higher education. My submission uses 2021 Census data to see where the school leavers of the mid-2020s to 2030 are located, and how this aligns with higher education policy.

City/rest of state growth rates

Full regional classifications are not yet included in the publicly available 2021 Census data, so the chart below uses a greater capital city/rest of state classification. The age groups cover the young people who will finish Year 12 and seek university entry from mid-decade through to 2030. It compares their numbers to those of people the same age at the 2016 Census, who reached/will reach university age in the first half of the 2020s.

Overall the population of 9 to 16 year olds was in 2021 13.5 per cent higher than in 2016 in the greater capital city areas and 7.8 per cent higher in rest of state areas. Population growth is significant in both categories, but larger in the cities that will get a smaller funding increment.

The chart also shows variations by specific year of age, with growth rates most aligned in the 11-to-14-years age groups.

Note: Citizens only. Source: ABS Census 2016 and 2021, TableBuilder Pro
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Inflation and student places under Job-ready Graduates

Earlier this week I made my first submission to the Universities Accord review. One issue the submission covers is whether Job-ready Graduates policies can meet demand from the so-called Costello baby boom birth cohort. This post looks at how large variations in Commonwealth contribution rates and misaligned systems of indexation could affect overall growth in student places. A subsequent post looks at the geographic distribution of places.

The relative value of Commonwealth contributions

Job-ready Graduates combines a fixed maximum basic grant amount (MBGA) for higher education courses (all CSP coursework except medical places and places for regional Indigenous bachelor degree students) with Commonwealth contributions that vary between disciplines. The maximum funding a university can receive for higher education courses is the lesser of their full-time equivalent places delivered multiplied by the relevant Commonwealth contributions or the MBGA amount in its funding agreement.

This system creates trade-offs between opportunities for students, which are maximised by focusing on the courses with the lowest Commonwealth contributions, and meeting skills needs, with skills shortage occupations typically requiring graduates from courses with higher Commonwealth contributions.

Trade-offs were already a feature of the pre-JRG funding system, but JRG exacerbated them as the chart below shows. One new place in a funding cluster 4 course (medicine, dentistry, agriculture) costs 24.6 places in funding cluster 1 course (business, law, most humanities and social sciences). Under the pre-JRG system the highest funding cluster was 10.9 times the lowest funding cluster; still high, but a less extreme trade-off than under JRG.

We don’t yet have 2021 enrolment data to see where enrolments are moving by discipline. A move towards the higher Commonwealth contribution fields will consume more of the available funding, leaving less money to finance additional student places.

I don’t believe this is an immediate major issue. System capacity may be down on 2020 JRG projections but so is domestic demand, due to a strong labour market and flat or falling numbers of school leavers with an ATAR in the big states. But increased school leaver numbers due to a larger birth cohort will push demand up again in the mid-2020s.

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The public-private balance: A failed rationale for setting student contributions

A previous post on the reasons given by government for setting student contributions, like this post based on a new paper of mine, listed five rationales used for implemented policies: course costs, private benefits, public benefits, increasing resources per student place, and incentivising course choices.

A sixth rationale has repeatedly been considered but never become policy, the idea that the distribution of benefits between public and private should drive the distribution of costs between public and private, as represented by the government and students. This post explains where this idea came from and why it has always been rejected.

Origins in the justification for HECS

As my earlier post noted, the public-private benefits idea first appeared in the Wran report that led to HECS. Its logic was not explained, but I think it was a corollary of the private benefits argument – that if students should pay for their higher education because they received private benefits then it seemed to follow that the government, on behalf of the public, should pay for the benefits they received. This is a normative argument about who should pay rather than an empirical claim that public subsidies produce public benefits.

The Wran report did not recommend this approach because calculating private and public benefits was too hard.

The balance metaphor

As part of the 1996 Budget the Howard government, with Amanda Vanstone as minister, introduced private benefits as a rationale for specific course contributions. Conceptually, however, this was quite different to the private-public benefits idea. The Vanstone version was the private benefits of a course relative to the private benefits of other courses, rather than the Wran private benefits of a course as a proportion of all benefits private and public or, at a system level, overall higher education private benefits as a proportion of all benefits.

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