Big proposed changes to the HELP repayment system – a higher first income threshold & a marginal rate of repayment

Today the government announced big changes to the HELP repayment system. Its proposal involves several interconnected conceptual and practical considerations.

The first issue is where to set the first repayment threshold – how much should a HELP debtor earn before they start repaying? The government proposal is for a higher first threshold.

The second issue is annual repayment amounts, which affect the disposable income of debtors and how long it takes them to repay their debt. The government proposal is for most debtors to repay less HELP debt each year, increasing their annual disposable income but also their repayment time.

The third issue is the method of repayment. Should it be – as we have had since 1989 – a system which levies a % of all income when income reaches a threshold, or should we have a marginal rate system, which is a levy on income above the threshold (like the current income tax system). The government has decided on a marginal rate system.

All three issues intersect with the public finance element of HELP – the cash flow implications of the changes for the Commonwealth, and the costs in interest subsidies and bad debt. These will all be negative for the government.

In this post, I will look at the annual repayment implications for debtors, effective marginal rates of repayment, and make some initial comments about selling this reform to debtors and voters.

What the government proposes

The first threshold for repayment will go to $67,000, from $54,435 for 2024-25, and approximately $56,000 after CPI indexation for 2025-26 (I have assumed 3% indexation, which seems to be around what the government has estimated).

From this first threshold of $67,000 we will move to a marginal rate of repayment, at two levels – 15% from $67,000 to $124,999 and 17% from $125,000. These rates would replace the current whole-of-income rates ranging from 1% to 10%.

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Mapping Australian higher education 2023 – October 2024 data update

Update 20/12/2025: More recent data here.

An updated version of Mapping Australian higher education is not on the horizon, but to extend the life of the 2023 version I have updated the data behind the charts and some tables. An Excel file with these and the two further updates mentioned below is here.

Further update 6/11/2024: The 2023 Student Experience Survey results have been released. Some question changes have broken the time series but the replacement question results are recorded.

Further update 12/11/2024: A careful reader has identified the missing higher education provider mentioned below and identified other errors in my institutes of higher education appendix. Hopefully the list is now correct and complete. This update also includes 2024 bachelor and above attainment data.

The original pdf with explanatory text is here.

Some noteworthy changes since its publication:

  • We now know that domestic enrolments fell in both 2022 and 2023; enrolments last declined in 2004 (figure 3)
  • International students – although no regular reader of this blog needs this pointed out – recovered strongly from the COVID period (figure 10)
  • The source country skew of international students means that a top 15 source country does not necessarily send a lot of students, but for the first time an African country made it to the list, Kenya with 6,538 students in 2023 (figure 11) (and 7,330 onshore YTD July in 2024).
  • Higher education student income support recipient numbers continued to fall, to 156,710 in mid-2023, the lowest figure since 2009 (figure 18). While since 2022 falling income support recipients is partly due to fewer students, except for a COVID spike the number has been in structural decline since 2017.
  • Staff numbers recovered strongly in 2023 to be roughly what they were in March 2020 (figure 19)
  • HELP repayments increased increased significantly, from $5.56 billion in respect of 2021-22 to $7.8 billion in respect of 2022-23 (figure 31B). Most of this was due to voluntary repayments increasing from $780 million to $2.9 billion, as debtors sought to evade high indexation (some of which will be refunded if the indexation reduction bill passes).
  • Short-term graduate full-time employment rates improved, in 2023 reaching the best level since 2009 (figure 40)
  • The number of higher education providers continued to increase, from 198 in mid-2023 to 211 in October 2024 (appendix A and appendix B).

The Department of Education’s failure to release the 2023 Finance or Student Experience Survey publications means that the update is not as full as I would like.

Job-ready Graduates price effects?: An update with 2022 enrolment data

The official release yesterday of the CPI-indexed Job-ready Graduates student contributions for 2025 has prompted questions about what impact the JRG price increases have had on enrolments.

With arts, business and law student contributions to hit nearly $17,000 a year in 2025 – with our bout of inflation having increased them from $14,500 in 2021 – students would be wise to think about whether this is a sensible investment. That’s $50,000 for a basic 3 year degree or $85,000 for common combinations like arts/law or business/law.

On the other hand, as I have argued, students follow their interests while keeping an eye on which courses within their cluster of interests would have the best employment and salary outcomes.

The most sophisticated work to date, using NSW data to 2021, found small effects in the expected directions.

Using simple trends in subjects taken, this post will look at domestic commencing EFTSL by discipline in the 2010-2022 period, drawing on the annual commencing load spreadsheet produced by the Department of Education. This does not distinguish between CSP and domestic full-fee students, but it is the best I can do with publicly available data.

Because I am comparing fields with very different absolute enrolments, I have converted them to an index, with 2010=1. So an index of 1.1 in a subsequent year would mean 10% more EFTSL, and an index of .9 would mean 10% fewer EFTSL.

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2024 funding by university for Commonwealth supported places

The Universities Accord final report noted the problem of ‘no consolidated source of government expenditure by higher education provider and program (such as the Commonwealth Grant Scheme)’. It is one of the many reporting and data availability issues that make understanding Australia’s higher education system unnecessarily difficult.

CGS revenue by higher education provider

In January, after a laborious process of transcribing information from funding agreements, I published the ‘higher education courses’ and ‘designated courses’ funding allocations. To this I have now added funding determinations information on demand driven Indigenous funding, the medical student loading, estimated HECS-HELP lending as of May 2024 and estimated upfront student contributions, also of May 2024. You can download the spreadsheet here. [Update 17/06/24: with revised funding agreements, 15 universities have increased higher education courses funding. The updated spreadsheet can be downloaded here.]

The chart below aggregates the programs into their two main categories, the CGS and student contributions, and ranks them from the largest recipient of funds, Monash University at $722.4 million, to the smallest, Charles Darwin University at $157.8 million.

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Bruce Chapman’s multi-rate marginal HELP repayment system – the PM’s ‘simpler’ option?

Last week the prime minister was asked about changes to the HELP loan system.  In response he referred to Accord recommendations that ‘the system can be made simpler and be made fairer’ (emphasis added), and that ‘we’ll be making announcements pretty soon on that’.

‘Fairer’ probably means a lower-of HELP debt indexation formula, moving the indexation date so that more recent compulsory repayments can be taken into account, and a marginal rate repayment system to remove high effective marginal tax rates.

But what did the PM mean by ‘simpler’? I’m guessing that this refers to moving away from the current 18-threshold and rate repayment system to a system with fewer thresholds.

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Lower-of CPI and Wage Price Index (WPI) HELP debt indexation – inherent weaknesses and design issues

This morning The Conversation published my argument, made last month on this blog, that HELP debt should be indexed at the lower of CPI or 4%. I argue that this is better than the other suggested ‘lower-of’ options, such as the government bond rate, the RBA cash rate, or a wage increase indicator. The Universities Accord final report chose the last option, specifically the Wage Price Index (WPI). WPI measures changes in hourly rates in the same job.

All the CPI alternatives have a relationship with CPI

A problem with all the lower-of proposals, except a fixed maximum, is that they have a relationship to CPI. If inflation starts going up the RBA increases its cash rate and government bond holders want higher interest rates to protect their real value. Workers and unions, often supported by policymakers, seek inflation compensating wage increases.

For wages set nationally, the federal government wants the minimum wage increase linked to inflation this year. If the Fair Work Commission grants this increase, minimum wage and other CPI-driven wage rises will flow through to future WPI figures.

Real wage increases, over-and-above CPI, also push up WPI. Aged care workers have recently been awarded a large real wage increase. Statistics on enterprise agreements show wage increases returning to their normal pattern of exceeding both WPI and CPI.

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The politics of multi-rate marginal HELP repayments

In a couple of previous posts, I examined reasons for moving to a marginal rate system for repaying HELP debt, as proposed by the Universities Accord final report, and what the rates might be.

Under a marginal rate system HELP debtors would repay a % of all income above a threshold amount, instead of a % of all income once a threshold is reached, as now. An advantage of marginal rate repayment systems is that they can reduce effective marginal tax rates. High EMTRs discourage people from taking on more paid work. In some cases under the current system EMTRs exceed 100%, so disposable income goes down despite nominal income going up.

The Accord final report and the minister, Jason Clare, also suggest reducing annual repayments, at least for lower income HELP debtors. Except for HELP debtors just above an income threshold in the current system (especially the first one, where there are very high EMTRs) this is not an inherent feature of marginal rate systems compared to current arrangements. But it could be a political selling point for a marginal rate system designed to reduce repayments.

To cut annual repayments for lower income HELP debtors without causing a major reduction in HELP repayment revenue the government would need to introduce a multi-rate marginal system. This is implied in the Accord final report discussion. Multi-rate systems progressively increase the marginal rate as income goes up. There are many possible sets of rates, but my previous post looks at 7%-17%-22% and 10%-15%-20% models.

This post goes through some of the political implications of moving to a marginal rate system.

How will the percentage numbers be interpreted?

One initial challenge will be convincing people that a 7% or 10% first marginal rate will usually reduce their repayments compared to the current seemingly lower rates. How can charging 7% increase disposable income compared to 1%?!

Of course the answer is what the percentages are of, but for people half paying attention, who have never thought about marginal versus whole of income rates before, a higher percentage rate reducing their repayments is going to seem counter-intuitive.

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Possible marginal HELP repayment rates under Universities Accord reforms

The Universities Accord final report proposes changing how HELP repayments are calculated. It recommends abolishing our current system, which levies a % of all income once an income threshold is reached. It would be replaced with a system that charges a % of income above the threshold – a marginal rate system.

A major reason given for this change was to end the ‘unfair situation’ of some HELP debtors having very high effective marginal tax rates. These can exceed 100% in some cases, so that an increase in taxable income results in lower disposable income. In addition to the fairness issues, high EMTRs can lead to people working fewer hours and less income tax revenue.

Other Accord final report comments, however, suggest HELP repayment redesign with purposes beyond the EMTR issue. While not specifying thresholds or marginal rates, the report suggests a system in which the ‘majority of HELP debtors who make a repayment … would repay less in a given year’. They warn, however, that a ‘small number of higher income debtors (likely less than 10% of HELP debtors) [would] make higher repayments in a given year’.

Subsequent Jason Clare media interviews suggest that policy thinking on repayment systems has moved beyond a general preference for a marginal rate system. Referencing unpublished research by Bruce Chapman, Clare said on the day the final report was released that ‘someone on an income of $75,000 a year would pay every year about $1,000 less.’ He gave the same example again this week.

Speaking to the SMH, Chapman expanded on how the new system might work. He envisaged a multi-rate marginal HELP repayment system: ‘a person earning $86,000 would only be taxed the 5 per cent repayment rate on the income above the threshold at which the rate kicks in, being $84,430. All income below that threshold would be levied at the lower rates.’ A multi-rate marginal system is also consistent with the Accord final report reference to some HELP debtors repaying more each year than they do now.

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Why does the Universities Accord final report suggest repaying HELP debt on a marginal rate – a % of income above the threshold, rather than all income?

One quirk of the HELP repayment system is that, on reaching each repayment threshold, the debtor pays a % of their entire income. England and New Zealand followed Australia in creating income contingent student loans. But their repayment systems are based on a % of their income above the threshold – they have marginal rate systems. The Australian income tax system also uses marginal rates.

The Universities Accord final report HELP repayment recommendations include ‘moving to arrangements based on marginal income’.

As explained below, this Accord change would reduce ‘effective marginal tax rates’ – the loss of disposable income on each dollar above the threshold. Under the current system, EMTRs can exceed 100% – so that earning an extra dollar reduces rather than increases a HELP debtor’s annual disposable income. The Accord final report calls this an ‘unfair situation’.

The Accord final report does not specify a marginal rate – an issue I discuss in another post. England and New Zealand have marginal loan repayment rates of 9% and 12% respectively above their repayment thresholds.

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Changing the HELP indexation date – 30 November?

A common HELP indexation complaint over the last couple of years is that compulsory repayments during the financial year are not deducted prior to indexation. I explained the current system in this post last year.

In that post, I noted that one reason for not taking compulsory HELP repayments out prior to the current 1 June indexation date is that their exact amount is not yet known by the ATO. The repayment amount is calculated after the financial year ends, on 30 June, and during tax return processing. There are many reasons why HELP repayments sent via the PAYG system could be less or more than the final repayment amount.

The ATO has raised another administrative obstacle, which is that HELP repayments are not separately identified in the PAYG information it receives from employers. As the ATO collects salary information, and already knows who is a HELP debtor, it perhaps would not be that hard to infer why the amount withheld from an employee is higher than income tax rates require. But clarity on what is intended as a HELP repayment would require system re-designs for the ATO and employers. HELP PAYG information would still often vary from the final correct amount, so the system would need a reconciliation after 30 June, with corresponding adjustment of indexation up or down. This would add complexity and administrative costs. These practical issues rule out real-time reduction of HELP balances.

The Accord final report instead recommends another option, changing the date of HELP indexation. They do not, however, suggest a date.

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