Senate inquiry submission on mass cancelling courses for international students, banning new higher education providers, and Indigenous demand driven funding for medical courses

Update 28/11/2025: The Senate passed some amendments to this bill. These are noted in the original posts.

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Senate inquiry submissions are due on Friday for the Education Legislation Amendment (Integrity and Other Measures) Bill 2025.

I am releasing my late draft submission in case it helps people finalising their own submissions and to identify any errors or omissions on my part.

Update 17/11/25: Final submission on the Senate committee website.

It builds on my three prior blog posts on the subject – on mass cancelling courses for international students, on a de facto ban on new higher education providers, and on extending Indigenous demand driven funding to medical courses.

Mass cancelling CRICOS course registrations

The main new content in the submission is description of existing legislative powers that can achieve the same claimed policy goals as the course cancellation proposal.

The practical effect of the bill, if it passes, would be to enable the suspension of the rule of law. It would allow the minister to make decisions according to vague criteria, without consulting anyone or considering other relevant laws. Due process would be abolished; providers could be penalised with course cancellation even if they have followed the law and acted ethically at all times.

It shocks me that this Trump-style bid to rule by executive order has even been introduced into Parliament. It’s staggering that, given nearly a year to think again since its original defeat last year, the government has brought back a bill that is, in some places, even more defective than their first attempt. I am referring here to removing the requirement to consult TEQSA or ASQA before cancelling a course on ‘standard of delivery’ grounds.

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Is the government introducing a de facto ban on new higher education providers?

Update 28/11/2025: Last night the Senate accepted Coalition amendments that exempt higher education providers and TAFEs from the requirement to offer courses to domestic students for two years before being eligible to offer courses to international students. So effectively the provision discussed in this post applies only to non-TAFE registered training organisations. As I noted in the original post, offering courses to domestic students for two years is much easier for RTOs than higher education providers. Large numbers of RTOs have already met the requirement and could move into international education.

While this is good news, enrolment caps the government will try again to legislate next year could prove another insurmountable obstacle to education providers of any kind entering the international market.

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Last week Claire Field published an interesting overview of 15 new higher education providers since January 2024. But growth of this kind would become very difficult if the government’s ESOS amendment bill passes unamended. It would limit registration of new providers offering courses to international students. This post examines whether the proposed restriction would, in practice, be a de facto ban on new higher education providers.

Under the ESOS amendment bill providers could not offer courses to international students without first delivering courses to domestic students, but providers are generally not competitive in the domestic market without offering FEE-HELP loans. But to get access to FEE-HELP, providers must demonstrate experience in delivering higher education – in practice usually by teaching the international students the ESOS bill would stop them recruiting.

Legislative references are to ESOS Act 2000 section numbers, as they are or would be if the amendment bill passes unchanged.

The proposed changes

The ESOS amendment bill would give the minister the power to suspend, for up to 12 months, applications and processing of applications for course and provider registration: sections 14C to 14F.

To be registered on CRICOS to offer courses to international students the provider must have delivered courses for consecutive study periods over at least two years to domestic students in Australia: section 11(2).

This post focuses on the section 11(2) change by looking at how providers have entered the international and domestic markets in recent years.

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The education minister should not have the power to cancel ‘classes of courses’ for international students

Update 28/11/2025: Last night the Senate passed the ESOS amendment bill with Coalition amendments. While I still believe this provision counts as very poor public policy – for reasons exanded up in my Senate inquiry submission – the Coalition changes do improve things somewhat. These are noted in the text below.

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The government is having another go at its 2024 Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) legislation, reintroducing it earlier this month minus the enrolment caps that saw it blocked in the Senate last November.

This post draws on and adds to things I wrote last year about proposed ministerial powers to suspend and cancel ‘classes of courses’.

The amendments discussed in this post were partly why I regarded the 2024 ESOS amendment bill as the single worst piece of higher education related legislation to come before the Parliament in my career.

What took it beyond standard bad policy was its use of broad ministerial discretion with minimal constraints on how it is exercised. That creates rule of law problems, making it hard to know in advance what the rules are. If passed, the amendments could lead to some education providers being arbitrarily punished for the actions of others.

Legislative references are to the section numbers of the ESOS Act 2000, as they are or as they would be if the bill passes unamended.

A mass course cancellation power

The bill gives the education minister power to simultaneously suspend or cancel multiple ESOS course registrations at multiple providers: division 1AB. It does this by making the unit of regulation a ‘class of courses’ – the definition of which is discussed below.

This mass cancellation power differs from existing laws that give the ‘ESOS agency’ (TEQSA in higher ed, ASQA in VET) power to suspend or cancel the registration of specific courses or specific providers: sections 83 to 92. It also differs from the current power of the immigration minister to issue a ‘suspension certificate’ to a provider. This can be done in specified circumstances such as fraud in visa applications, students breaching visa conditions, and other visa issues: sections 97 to 103.

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International students and the rental market

The housing section of the RBA’s report last week on international students and the economy had higher education media dismissing the contribution of students to rent increases as a ‘furphy’. I agree that international students are at most one factor amongst many in post-COVID accommodation market problems. That said, the RBA may understate the scale of international education’s contribution to rental demand.

Student Experience Survey results

The RBA used the Student Experience Survey to try to work out the proportion of students in the private rental market where they compete with others for accommodation. The question the SES asks is below.

The RBA’s conclusion that about half of international students are in the private rental market is based on the result below, which is for undergraduates. Taking a broad definition of undergraduate that was about 40% of international students in 2023. But assuming it is broadly representative, there is still one number that I have persistently struggled to understand in this survey, which is the high percentage of international students who say they live with their parents – 19% in 2023. Can that be right?

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What do Australian governments owe international students?

Gaby Ramia, a University of Sydney academic, has long written about international student issues, including their security and well-being. His latest book, International student policy in Australia: The welfare dimension, accuses successive governments of ‘policy inaction’ on international student welfare.

The book opens with what became an infamous statement by then Prime Minister Scott Morrison. When asked, in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, about the plight of JobKeeper-ineligible international students, Morrison responded that ‘these [student] visas and those who are in Australia under various visa arrangements, they’re obviously not held here compulsorily. If they’re not in a position to be able to support themselves, then there is the alternative for them to return to their home countries.’

A transactional relationship between Australia and international students

As Ramia’s book shows, in itself the prime minister’s statement was unsurprising. While Australia has longstanding consumer protection policies for international students, it has not offered general welfare-state type benefits. International students self-insure against the adversities that welfare states cover. As a visa condition they are supposed to arrive with savings. They are required to take out private health insurance. Education providers must provide information about welfare and other services, but are not obliged to deliver them.

Over the last quarter century the government has, to extents that vary over time, also encouraged international students to meet Australia’s labour market needs. But there was never any intention that the government fund international student related services. The government offered an Australian education and access to Australia’s labour market, not Australian welfare state support.

Ramia, by contrast, thinks that the government should take more responsibility for the welfare of international students. This should start with public transport concessions where these are not already offered and access to Medicare.

Ramia’s book was completed before the government changed its mind on international students, and started trying to cut their numbers. That policy turn creates new issues about the relationship between the government and international students.

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Temporary graduate visas – trends in applications, grants and populations

As part of its international student policy announcement, the Coalition promised a ‘rapid review into the Temporary Graduate Visas (subclass 485)’. The review would ‘address the misuse of post-study work arrangements as a way to gain access to the Australian labour market and as a pathway to permanent migration.’

While recent polls suggest the Coalition will not form government, net overseas migration will remain an important political issue. It is worth understanding trends in major migration categories such as the 485 visa.

This post summarises the available 485 visa data. A key point is that although applications for new 485 visas in 2024-25 to date are lower than in previous years, in the coming years there is the potential for significant increases in total 485 visa holder numbers.

Purpose of the 485 temporary graduate visa

Today’s temporary graduate visa is descended from an early 2010s policy that was designed to make Australia more competitive in the international education market. It does this by letting former international students access the labour market, so doing this is not ‘misuse’ according to the policy’s intent. The pathway element is more contentious. The 485 visa can be a pathway to permanent residence but it offers no guarantees. Government and student expectations proably differ on this matter.

In any case, as the numbers reported below show, there is no way all 485 visa holders in Australia in early 2025 could transition to a permanent migration program of 185,000 people for 2024-25.

Trends in the number of temporary graduate visa holders

The Department of Home Affairs does not publish how many people hold a 485 visa. The closest we get to a stock figure is a monthly count of temporary migrants in Australia. As at 28 February 2025, 214,714 people were in Australia on 485 visas. This was about 14,000 down on the 30 September 2024 peak. The monthly in-country totals undercount visa holders as some are temporarily overseas.

Since 2022 the primary visa holder share of the total – that is, the former student with the relevant qualification – has decreased from 75-80% of the total to 70-72%. There has been greater growth in secondary visa holders, the partners and children of primary visa holders.

Country of origin of 485 visa holders

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The Coalition’s plan to reduce international student numbers – some first thoughts

As rumoured in recent months, the Coalition has decided, if it wins office on 3 May, to cap commencing international student enrolments at a percentage of all commencing enrolments. The precise number is yet to be settled, but is expected to be around 25% and will only apply to public universities.

Student experience as well as migration concerns

A key conceptual difference with the government’s policy is that the Coalition wants to improve the domestic student experience as well as take pressure off accommodation markets. That’s why they chose a % of enrolments rather than, as under Labor, formulas driven by past enrolment patterns – although Labor did include a penalty for institutions with high concentrations of international students.

So far as I know, no careful research examines whether high concentrations of international students adversely affect domestic students in measurable ways. There are many anecdotal complaints, especially around group assignments. Is it a coincidence that computing, engineering and business courses, which have high concentrations of international students, have relatively low student satisfaction (chart below)?

Perhaps international students have nothing to do with it. Long ago, looking at the old CEQ results, I observed that students in vocational courses seem less satisfied than other students. Speculatively they have more instrumental motivations, and so enjoy study less. They study in fields where universities compete with industry and the professions for staff. Academic salaries might not attract the best possible teachers.

Questions about the domestic student experience are at least worth asking and answering as best we can. Universities are too conflicted to do it or release the results if they do. It’s another argument for making higher education data available to researchers inside and outside the academy (e61 is doing a great job on this kind of research).

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Mapping Australian higher education 2023 – data update March 2025

Update 20/12/2025: More recent data here.

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I won’t have the capacity to produce another edition of my Mapping Australian higher education report in the foreseeable future, but I am extending the life of the October 2023 edition by updating the data behind the charts.

Mapping‘s chart data is the only publicly-available source of long-term time series data on many higher education topics, especially on financial matters.

I had been waiting on the 2023 university finances report before releasing another chart data update. That finally happened yesterday. Despite a record 27 universities reporting deficits, in the aggregate there was a small surplus, after a loss overall in 2022.

2023 had some weak numbers for the two main Commonwealth student programs, the Commonwealth Grant Scheme and HELP. Several factors were behind this: temporary COVID places coming out of the system, Job-ready Graduates reductions in total funding rates for some courses, and weak domestic demand. These programs trended up in 2024 and 2025, as seen in the chart below, although high CPI-driven indexation was a significant factor.

The updated chart data is available here.

Student visa applications withdrawn

The Department of Home Affairs does not routinely report statistics on withdrawn student visa applications. At my request, they supplied me with student visa applications withdrawn data for 2019, 2023 and 2024. 2019 is my pre-COVID, pre-migration policy change, comparison year.

As I expected, with a stable market and policy framework the proportion of visa applications that are withdrawn is quite low – equivalent to around 1% of applications lodged in 2019. I don’t know of any research into these withdrawn applicants, but perhaps their circumstances changed or they received a better offer from another country.

My hypothesis in making my data request was that the period of rapid change in international education policy from the later months of 2023 created new incentives to withdraw student visa applications.

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Are the government’s policies working to reduce international student numbers? Part 2, student visas granted

A previous post looked at demand from international students, as measured by student visa applications. By July 2024 all student deterrent policies announced to date were in place, so the last six months of 2024 could be used to assess initial policy impact.

That analysis found that demand for vocational education declined significantly, whether compared to 2023 or the more normal pre-COVID year of 2019. For higher education, demand was down on 2023. Compared to 2019, higher education demand in 2024 from migration-sensitive countries like India or Pakistan was well down, but demand from other important source countries increased or decreased only slightly.

Visa applications of course must be assessed by the Department of Home Affairs. Visas granted depend on visa processing levels and visa grant rates.

The visa grant analysis below is broadly consistent the first post’s applications analysis. Visa applications and grants in 2024 were both down on 2023. However, 2024 visa applications were up on 2019 but visa grants were down, reflecting fewer applications being processed and lower approval rates.

For both visa applications and grants vocational education has been hit hard. Higher education is more resilient overall, with visa applications and grants both up on 2019.

Due to unprocessed applications and unresolved appeals against visa application rejections, not all 2024 applications have been finalised. These could result in 2025 visa grants that exceed expectations created by recent application levels.

Less clear links between cause and effect

Drawing straightish lines between policy changes and policy consequences is harder for visa grants than applications. Delays between visa applications and processing complicate the analysis. By mid-2024 Home Affairs had a huge backlog – over 113,000 unprocessed applications – including many received prior to 23 March 2024 when significant rule changes came into effect. Because some old rules apply to applications received before policy change dates, different criteria can be used in the same processing month.

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